"In effect, scammers are exploiting principles wired into the DNA of the phone system: It is set up to make sure that calls get through, no matter what. Carriers don’t look at the content of calls before connecting them, and multiple companies touch each call." https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-companies-play-big-role-in-robocall-scourge-but-remedies-are-elusive-11566120720
Fortunately, carriers are starting to work to address this: https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/14/20805276/att-t-mobile-caller-verified-shaken-stir-call-authentication-fcc-robocalls-spam
Guys it’s called Outbound Only wholesale service where CLECs KNOWN for providing connectivity to spammers (like Local Access, LLC) select this product from major carriers because they can spoof all the ANIs they want without having to authenticate the call with a Diversion header. The “solutions” all “address” the issue at the end point so the carriers don’t lose their revenue for transport from these customers who whose contracts would normally have been ended early due to violation of ToS. It’s too easy to say “we just provide the pipe” and collect a check.
Yep, all of this. If the onus were instead put back on the originator and not the terminator we wouldn't have this problem. Instead, all 4 wireless carriers have, at least, come together to build and agree on a framework that will sign the information being passed and verify that at least we know this certain subset of calls is coming from who it says it is coming from.
By the time the call reaches the destination, the available information of the origination is limited to what’s in the INVITE or the IAM. Not much, without manual intervention, call traces, to what end? They’ll trace it back to Local Access sending calls via Centurylink, TWC, Comcast wholesale from an international IP in a place where our laws don’t apply. Endpoint solutions, specifically term carrier efforts, are half useful at best. They just result in an extreme amount of ANIs being blocked, and eventually when the real owner of that number tries to call someone on a carrier where their number has already been reported suspicious, the call may he intercepted before it even rings the handset. Carriers are afraid to fire their customers when necessary.
Oh, as far as OP is concerned, all carriers were actually shackled until just recently because the system was built on the groundwork of assume positive to allow call completion. There's actually very little any of the terminating carriers could do but terminate the calls. You could setup esn/ani blocking to block a single number or even a handset but what does that get you except a nightmare of a database to maintain, scrub and constantly update adding and deleting numbers as they are dropped, reassigned, ported, etc... The systems were built this way primarily to maintain continuity during the LNP push, we just had to assume someone was presenting crap in the wrong field or that X number had been ported from this carrier to that, etc... You could no.longer rely on something like the LERG to tell you what numbers really belong to what carrier and ani block incoming based on that data...so really....carriers created that free-for-all so people could keep their damned phone numbers....
Well told. We use LNP GUI for current ported carrier (and history) and now the LERG is only still good when you have the point code of another carrier you need to confirm. Otherwise for TN I imagine it’s like using localcallingguide.com for port status 😂 For the non telecom employees though, I really do miss TNID.US
I wonder if there’s a way to pass along the ESN field end-to-end for mobile originated calls. Requiring a backend verification matching ANI to ESN to complete the call. This would at least take care of mobile subscriber CPN integrity. For landlines there would be a token associated with the originating service that could serve the same purpose. With SIP it’s easy to just add a header but curious how that would work on SS7.
That’s rich coming from WF 😂
“Wells Fargo”